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WITHOUT JOINDER OF BOTH SPOUSES
by Clarice M. Davis
The Texas constitutions since 1845 have contained a provision pre-
venting a married man from alienating the homestead without the
consent of his wife.' The present provision is found in article 16, sec-
tion 50, which reads "nor shall the owner, if a married man sell the
homestead without the consent of the wife, given in such manner as
may be prescribed by law. . . ."' In addition to the constitutional pro-
vision restraining the sale of the homestead, article 1300' provides that
a married man may not sell the homestead without the consent of his
wife and that such consent shall be evidenced in the manner required
by articles 6605 and 6608.4
Despite these seemingly absolute constitutional and statutory pro-
visions restricting conveyance of the homestead, articles 4617 and 4618
of the Revised Civil Statutes' and section 157 of the Probate Code'
have created exceptions. These statutes provide for the transfer of
the homestead without joinder where the non-joining spouse has
either abandoned the marriage relationship or has become insane. Case
law has extended these exceptions even further. The "abnormal cir-
cumstances"7 in which a conveyance of the homestead without join-
der of both spouses is allowed are examined in this Comment.
I. ABANDONMENT'
As early as 1856, the Texas Supreme Court held that a wife could
convey the community property homestead without joinder of her
I RHEA, TEXAS SEPARATE AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY, LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS 290
(2d ed. 1938); TEx. CONST. Art. VII, § 22 (1845).
'TEX. CONST. art. 16 (1876).
'TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1300 (1962).
4 TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 6605, 6608 (1960). Article 6605 provides that the
acknowledgment of a married woman must be taken after she has been shown the deed, had
it explained to her, and has stated apart from her husband, that she has willingly signed it
and does not wish to retract it. Article 6608 provides the form for such an acknowledgment.
'TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4617 (1960); art. 4618 (Supp. 1966).
'TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 157 (Supp. 1966).
HUE, TEXAS MARITAL RIGHTS 579 (1955).
8 Few cases have discussed what constitutes abandonment in any great detail. The treat-
ment, for the most part, has been restricted to a discussion of the most obvious principle, i.e.,
absence for a number of years. From the limited discussion available, it appears that before
a spouse is considered abandoned it must be shown that the absence is not temporary, regard-
less of the length of the absence. Fullerton v, Doyle, 18 Tex. 3 (1856). The most sensible
explanation is that it is not the physical absence of the spouse but the absence of a marital
relationship which determines the capacity of one spouse to deal with the property. Webb v.
Webb, 148 Tex. 405, 224 S.W.2d 868 (1949). In this case the court held valid a deed
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husband when he had abandoned her. In Fullerton v. Doyle9 the hus-
band abandoned his wife and thereafter contributed nothing to her
support. She owned no separate property, and the homestead was the
couple's only community property. The abandoned wife and her
three children were destitute, and to provide for her family, she con-
tracted to sell the homestead. After making the down payment, the
buyer refused to complete the sale and later sued to avoid the con-
tract. In answering the claim that a married woman could not give
good title to the property, the court stated, "The assent of the part-
ner who abandons the home and family, and the duties and powers of
the marriage relation is not requisite to the sale of the homestead."'"
The decision was based on an earlier case, Wright v. Hays," which
involved the power of an abandoned wife to sell non-homestead com-
munity property." The husband had been absent for five years during
which time the wife had acquired some real estate which presumably
was community property." Before her husband returned, the wife
transferred the property to her son by a previous marriage. There was
no evidence that the husband had intended to abandon the wife per-
manently. Nor was there evidence that the wife was in financial need.
If she had been, it could hardly be claimed that the conveyance was
necessary for her support since it was a gift. Nevertheless, the court
made this remarkable statement:
The default of the husband and the necessity of the wife's situation
require and the law authorizes her to assume his position for the care
of herself, her family, and property, and vest her with the capacity of
a feme sole. His desertion and absence are the foundation of her new
rights and authority ... [H]is desertion of the wife and country vests
in her the administration of such property, and confers upon her every
right of control or disposition which he could have enjoyed or exercised,
had he remained in the discharge of his duties as a husband. 4
executed by the wife to her husband in his presence after she had obtained an interlocutory
divorce decree in California. The court held that after separation a wife could convey her
separate property without joinder of her husband though he was physically present. There-
fore, the question of whether separation as opposed to abandonment creates these powers of
conveyance in a spouse apparently has been answered in the affirmative. Nelkin v. Young, 397
S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). There is some inconsistency in this position because
separation usually includes an element of voluntariness, or at least agreement, on the part of
both spouses. Separation, therefore, affords the possibility of making anticipatory arrangements
for the disposition of the property which is not found in the abandonment cases.
918 Tex. 3 (1856).
l0 id. at 14.
" 10 Tex. 130 (1853).
12 Prior to 1917 the statutes provided that during marriage the husband alone could con-
vey the wife's separate and the community property. Tex. Acts, 1848, ch. 79, §§ 1-3, 3
GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 78 (1898).
13Tex. Acts, 1848, ch. 79, § 3, 3 GAMMEi,, LAWS OF TEXAS 78 (1898), now TEX. REv.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4619 (1960).
1410 Tex. at 135-36 (1853).
1966]
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The similarity between the two cases is so appealing that one is
tempted to accept the decision in Fullerton as the logical extension of
the reasoning in Wright. However, in Wright the property involved
was non-homestead community property, which the husband pos-
sessed power to convey. In Fullerton the property involved was com-
munity property homestead, which one spouse (at that time the hus-
band) was forbidden to convey without joinder of the other."' In
effect the court in Wright held the wife could do what the husband
could do; while in Fullerton, the court held the wife could do what
the husband, under existing constitutional and statutory provisions,
was forbidden to do except with her joinder.
These two cases set the pattern for two trends which the courts
have followed consistently. The first is the use of non-homestead com-
munity property cases as the basis for decisions in homestead cases with
apparent disregard for the inherent dissimilarities between the two."8
The second is the courts' firm commitment to the proposition that
upon abandonment, the remaining spouse is endowed with the power
to give good title to the homestead without obtaining the other
spouse's consent to the conveyance.
After Fullerton the rule that an abandoned wife could make a valid
conveyance of the homestead seems to have been accepted with little
question. The principal area of doubt remaining was the need for
showing "necessity" before the abandoned spouse obtained this power.
It has been stated that the court should not "weigh in golden scales"
the necessity required before the wife should possess the power to sell
the community property unless the power had been used to defraud
the husband."7 In a case involving non-homestead property it was
stated that a necessity need not exist for the wife to convey her sepa-
rate estate when abandoned by the husband and that the necessity rule
only applies to community property for the protection of the hus-
band. 8 In a later case, the court concluded that even when the wife
possessed the power to convey non-homestead community property
due to necessity, the power was not exclusive and the abandoning hus-
band still retained his power to convey. 9 In view of the limited num-
ber of cases in this area and their apparent contradictions, a definite
" RHEA, TEXAS SEPARATE AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY, LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS, 290
(2d ed. 1938); TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 22 (1845).
18Wright v. Hays, 10 Tex. 130 (1853), Pierce v. Gibson, 108 Tex. 62, 184 S.W. 502
(1916), and Gilley v. Troop, 146 S.W. 954 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) error ref,, all are ex-
amples of non-homestead cases later used to justify the decision in a homestead case.
'
7 Zimpleman v. Robb, 53 Tex. 274 (1880).
'" Clements v. Ewing, 71 Tex. 370, 9 S.W. 312 (1888).19 King v. King, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 473, 91 S.W. 633, 635 (1906).
[Vol. 20:794
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conclusion as to the requirement of "necessity" is virtually impos-
sible. Suffice it to say that a conveyance made without a showing of
necessity is more questionable.
In 1906 a civil appeals court faced the problem of the validity of
an abandoned husband's deed to the community property homestead.
Following the previous decisions empowering the wife to convey
under these circumstances, the court held the deed was valid." Later,
it was held that upon abandonment, the wife could validly convey her
separate property homestead.21
Thus, before the existence of any statutory provisions, both hus-
band and wife upon abandonment were allowed to convey valid title
to the community or separate property homestead without joinder. In
1917, the legislature amended article 4621 (now articles 4617 and
4618) to give the wife statutory power to convey her separate prop-
erty homestead upon abandonment if she obtained a court order
authorizing the transfer.2 In 1957 the legislature amended these stat-
utes to authorize the husband to exercise a similar power in respect
to his separate property homestead.2s In 1963 article 4618 was amend-
ed to its present form to authorize the abandoned husband or wife
to convey his or her separate property homestead without first ob-
taining a court order authorizing the conveyance.'
The provisions of article 4617 and 4618 are expressly restricted to
homestead which is the separate property of the abandoned spouse.
21Mabry v. Kennedy, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 45, 108 S.W. 176 (1908) error ref. The court
did not discuss the question of necessity, but from the facts of the case it appears that the
husband conveyed the property to discharge a tax lien on it.
21 Mabry v. Citizens Lumber Co. 47 Tex. Civ. App. 443, 105 S.W. 1156 (1907) erro,
ref. At this time the statutes provided that during marriage the husband alone could convey
the wife's separate property. See note 12 supra.
" General Laws of Texas, 1917, ch. 194, S§ 1, 2.
' General and Special Laws of Texas, 1957, ch. 407, § 4, at 1234. Previously a non-
statutory right was assumed to exist. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4617 (1960):
A husband or wife who owns the homestead as separate property and who is
abandoned by his or her spouse, or whose spouse becomes insane, may encumber
or convey such property by applying to the District Court of the county of
his or her residence. The court in term time or vacation, upon satisfactory
proof that such encumbrance or conveyance would be advantageous to the
interest of the husband or wife applying shall make an order granting permis-
sion to make such encumbrance or conveyance of the homestead without the
joinder of the other spouse, and the married person who owns the homestead
so separate property may then encumber or convey such property without such
joinder.
14 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4618 (Supp. 1966):
The homestead, whether the separate property of the husband or of the
wife, or the community property of both shall not be disposed of except by the
joint conveyance of both the husband and the wife, except where the husband
or wife is insane or has permanently abandoned the other, in which instances
the husband or wife may sell and make title to any such homestead, if his or
her separate property, in the manner provided in Article 1288.
Since article 4617 was not amended at the same time, articles 4617 and 4618. are in con-
flict with each other.
1966]
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Therefore, it would seem by the rule of inclusio unis est exclusio
alterius that community property homestead would fall within the
constitutional and statutory language prohibiting alienation without
joinder of both spouses."s In addition, since articles 4617 and 4618 spe-
cifically applied only to the wife from 1917 to 1957, one would
think that during this period the husband alone would have been
unable to convey either the community or separate property home-
stead. The argument in favor of these conclusions is supported by
the fact that prior to 1917 the court had allowed the husband or the
wife to convey community and separate property homesteads. Thus,
the 1917 legislation appeared to be aimed at prohibiting married per-
sons from conveying the homestead unless they complied with the
new statutory provisions. This would have limited the possible con-
veyances to the separate property homestead of the wife from 1917
to 1957. After 1957 either the husband or the wife could convey the
homestead under article 4617 but only if it was the separate property
of the grantor. The case law, however, has produced results completely
contrary to those which might be anticipated from a literal reading of
the statutes and the case law preceding their passage.
The courts apparently gave little thought to the negative implica-
tions of the 1917 amendment and held that the statutes merely pro-
vided another means for a valid conveyance by an abandoned spouse
-not the exclusive means."6 Therefore, an abandoned spouse from
1917 until 1963 was not restricted to the provisions and procedures
of article 4617 in order to convey the homestead. Rather, he or she
could convey not only the separate property homestead but also the
community property homestead under the powers developed by ju-
dicial interpretation prior to the statutory provisions.' Thus, the 1963
amendment to article 4618 which authorizes conveyances of separate
property homestead without obtaining a court order was only a codi-
fication of the existing case law. The effect of holding that article
4617 was cumulative rather than exclusive was to allow spouses to
use its procedures if they chose. But a conveyance was not void mere-
" The constitutional provision merely prohibits the husband from conveying the home-
stead without joinder of his wife. However, when this provision was written, the wife had
no power to convey her separate or their community property. Tex. Acts, 1848, ch. 79,
§ 1-3, 3 GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 78 (1898). In 1913, article 4621 [now articles 4617
and 4618] was amended to allow the wife to convey her separate property and at the same
time, article 4621 [now articles 4617 and 4618] was also amended to read that the home-
stead whether community property of both or separate property of one could not be dis-
posed of except by joint conveyance of both spouses. General Laws of Texas, 1913, ch. 32,
1, at 62.
'Ross v. Tide Water Oil Co., 136 Tex. 66, 145 S.W.2d 1089 (1941).2 7 Fullerton v. Doyle, 18 Tex. 3 (1856); Mabry v. Kennedy, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 45, 108
S.W. 176 (1908) error ref.
[Vol. 20:794
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ly because an abandoned spouse did not obtain the required court
order before selling the separate or community property homestead.
The result was that the obvious protections for the unwary buyer or
absent spouse which were provided in the judicial procedures of article
4617 were lost.
The need for these protections is most apt to arise when there is a
question as to the existence of the alleged abandonment. Normally, a
spouse will not wish to convey the homestead without the joinder of
the other spouse unless there has been an actual abandonment. How-
ever, under the cumulative interpretation and under the present pro-
visions of article 4618 conveyances can be made before there is an
authoritative decision on the issue of abandonment. In the absence of
a prior determination, the spouse who has conveyed the homestead
without obtaining the court order provided in article 4617 may later
contest the validity of the deed on the ground that abandonment had
not in fact occurred.28 To avoid such questionable conveyances, it is
only necessary to insist that any married person comply with article
4617 and obtain a court order before conveying the separate property
homestead. If such procedures were required in all cases, the issue of
abandonment would be settled immediately when the judge granted
the order giving the abandoned spouse powers of disposition over the
homestead. In this manner both the buyer and the absent spouse would
be protected against the possible unauthorized action of the conveying
spouse.
In summary, the case law indicates that conveyances of the home-
stead without joinder of both spouses seem to be possible under the fol-
lowing circumstances: (1) if the homestead is the separate property of
the conveying spouse and a court order is obtained under the provi-
sions of article 4617; (2) if the homestead is the separate property
of the conveying spouse and no court order is obtained; (3) if the
homestead is the community property and no court order is obtained.
The second and third circumstances present situations where the
buyer must be particularly careful because the conveying spouse is
acting upon an unadjudicated power to convey. In these cases the
careful buyer would be well advised to investigate the facts of the
purported abandonment to be certain that it has actually occurred. He
2 8Nelkin v. Young, 397 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) is a good illustration. Here,
the wife signed a note mortgaging the homestead, but later sued to enjoin the sale. The buyer
in attempting to defend his title claimed that the prohibition against mortgaging the home-
stead without the joinder of both spouses did not apply because the husband and wife though
married, were separated. In holding the deed invalid, the court said that even though the
homestead was her separate property, the evidence did not show whether the husband and
wife were permanently separated when she signed the note.
1966]
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should also investigate the apparent "necessity" for the spouse to make
the sale since this may be determinative of whether the power to con-
vey exists.
II. IMPRISONMENT
The ability of one spouse to convey good title to the homestead
without joinder while the nonjoining spouse is in prison has not been
litigated. However, the subject has arisen in regard to non-homestead
commurnity property. In Slator v. Neal"' the wife sold community
property while her husband was imprisoned for a felony. When the
husband returned, he tried to recover the property, claiming that the
wife had no power to sell. In sustaining the validity of the sale, the
court said that the sentence and confinement of the husband:
is certainly incompatible with the idea of his management and control
of their community property. For all practical purposes, outside of the
prison, the convict is civilter mortus. . . . [His confinement] cer-
tainly is equivalent to, and should be considered such an abandonment
of the wife, as would authorize her to manage, control, and dispose of
the common property in securing a support for herself and children."'
The reasoning in Slator was based on an assumption that imprison-
ment is equivalent to civil death or abandonment. This concept is
difficult to accept since nothing prohibits a convict from executing a
deed and it is obviously no problem to locate an imprisoned spouse.
In addition, no statutory policy deprives an imprisoned person of his
homestead rights. Furthermore, it appears that imprisonment does not
constitute abandonment for divorce purposes."
Nevertheless, in view of the court's tendency to equate non-home-
stead cases with homestead cases, there is every reason to suspect that
a court will follow the Slator rationale and allow a conveyance of the
community or separate property homestead without the joinder of the
imprisoned spouse. This prediction is supported by the court's state-
ment in Reed v. Beheler" in which the wife's conveyance of commun-
ity homestead property was allowed on the basis of her imprisoned
husband's insanity at the time of the conveyance. In dictum the court
indicated that the husband's imprisonment would also have given the
wife power to convey the homestead.
"'64 Tex. 222 (1885).
3Id. at 226.
" TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4629 (Supp. 1966) clearly contemplates abandon-
ment and imprisonment as two separate grounds for divorce by providing for abandonment
in § 2 and imprisonment in § 5.




A further exception to the general rule requiring joinder to convey
the homestead occurs when one spouse is insane."3 As in the abandon-
ment exceptions the principal problem has been whether the statu-
tory procedures furnish the exclusive method for conveyance or
whether they are merely cumulative of earlier rules.
A. Statutory Provisions
Prior to 1893, the statutes contained no provisions relating to the
power of either spouse to control, manage, or dispose of the com-
munity property when the other spouse was insane. In that year, the
legislature amended the three articles' which previously had pro-
vided only for the disposition of community property on intestacy
and made them applicable to the case when one spouse became insane.
If there were no surviving children, the property passed to the sane
spouse."' If there were surviving children, the sane spouse could obtain
management, control, and disposition over the community property
without the necessity of joinder by qualifying as community admin-
"a The concept of insanity in this context unfortunately remains something of a mystery.
There is little discussion in the cases regarding the symptons or medical diagnosis of the
insane's condition and the courts seem content with the mere label of insanity. In several
early cases there were indications that mental illness alone was insufficient to endow the other
spouse to convey the homestead. In Gersdorff v. Torres, 293 S.W. 560 (Tex. Comm. App.
1927), it was held that residence in an asylum alone was not proof of insanity. The decision,
however, was not adopted by the Supreme Court. Later, in Duarte v. Gutierrez, 175 S.W.2d
480 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943), the court held that the kind of insanity which would authorize
one spouse to convey without joinder of the other was a condition of the mind which is
apparently permanent or at least of lengthy duration. But, in Reed v. Beheler, 198 S.W.2d
625 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) the court held that the wife could execute a valid deed after
the husband had been in a prison hospital mental ward for less than a year. There was little
indication that any medical finding that the husband's insanity was of lengthy or permanent
duration had been made. The court stated that proof of such condition could not be required
since careful purchasers would be deterred from buying from the sane spouse if the con-
veyance could be set aside merely because the nonjoining spouse regained his sanity. Section
157 of the Probate Code speaks in terms of incompetency rather than insanity. It would
seem that after this change, insanity alone would be insufficient to allow one spouse to convey
unless that insanity rendered the other spouse incapable of knowing and appreciating the
effect of his deed. Yet, in Schmidt v. Schmidt, 403 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) the
court held that a deed executed by the husband was good because his wife was insane. There
had been no adjudication of her insanity and the court does not even discuss her incom-
petency in relation to executing a deed.
"
4 Tex. Acts, 1893, ch. 68, § 1, 10 GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 88 (1898). The com-
munity administration statutes were codified in 1895 under articles 2220-22 and 2236; in
1911 in articles 3593-95 and 3609; and in 1925 in articles 3662-64 and 3678. In 1955
those relating to insanity were put in § 157 of the Probate Code. Hereafter, they will be
referred to as articles 3662-64 if before 1955 and as § 157 if after 1955.
'The statute also provided that if the intestate or insane spouse owned separate property,
the survivor must qualify as community administrator in order to manage and dispose of the
community property. This additional provision has not been pertinent in any of the home-
stead cases.
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istrator.5" In order to qualify the surviving spouse was required to
file an inventory, have an appraisal of the estate made, post bond, and
be judicially appointed community administrator. 7
In 1955 when the Probate Code was enacted, the legislature sep-
arated the provisions for administration upon intestacy from those
pertaining to insanity. Section 157, which deals with administra-
tion upon insanity, as enacted in 1955, provided for either spouse to
acquire power to manage, control, and dispose of the entire com-
munity property when the other spouse was judicially declared incom-
petent. However, the surviving partner was first required to have
an appraisal of the estate made, file an inventory, and post bond.as
In 1957 these requirements were removed and the statute was amend-
ed to its present form."
In addition to section 157, since 1917 articles 4617 and 4618 have
provided that the wife can apply for a court order allowing her to
convey the homestead owned as her separate property if her husband
were insane.4 In 1957 these statutes were amended to give the same
privilege to the husband.4' In 1963, article 4618 was amended to al-
low conveyance without a court order."
Thus, if the statutory provisions alone are considered, the follow-
ing types of conveyances, and only the following types of convey-
ances, should have been permitted during the various time periods:
(1) Prior to 1893 no conveyance of the homestead without join-
3 Tex. Acts, 1893, ch. 68, 10 GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 88 (1898). The use of the
phrase "without joinder" clearly contemplates disposition of the homestead which ordinarily
requires joinder.
37 Ibid.
as TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. 5 157 (1956).
39 TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. 5 157 (Supp. 1966).
Whenever a husband or wife is judicially declared to be incompetent, the
other spouse, in the capacity of surviving partner of the marital partnership,
thereupon acquires full powers to manage, control, and dispose of the entire
community estate including the part which the incompetent spouse would
legally have power to manage in the absence of such incompetency and no
administration, community or otherwise, shall be necessary. Guardianship of the
estate of the incompetent spouse shall not be necessary when the other spouse
is competent unless the incompetent spouse owns separate property and then
as to such separate property only. The qualification of a guardian of the estate
of an incompetent spouse does not deprive the competent spouse of the right
to manage, control and dispose of the entire community estate as provided in
this Code.
There is some question as to whether "entire community" includes the homestead.
Presumably it does and the courts have apparently accepted this position. Schmidt v.
Schmidt, 403 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
'0 General Laws of Texas, 1917, ch. 194, 55 1, 2, at 436.
4
"TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4617 (1960).
42 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4618 (Supp. 1966). The provisions of articles 4617
and 4618 were combined in one article prior to 1925. Article 4621, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
(1911); article 2967, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (1895); and article 2851 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
(1879). See notes 23-24 supra for the present provisions.
[Vol. 20:794
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der of both spouses could have been possible even if one spouse
were insane.
(2) From 1893 to 1917 one spouse could convey the community
homestead if there were no children and the other spouse had
been declared insane. If there were children, the same spouse
could convey by posting bond, having an appraisal made, and
receiving a court appointment as community administrator.
(3) From 1917 to 1955 the husband or wife could convey com-
munity homestead under the community administration pro-
visions in (2) above, and the wife could convey her separate
property homestead if she obtained the court order required
in article 4617.
(4) From 1955 to 1957 either spouse could convey community
homestead under the provisions of section 157 of the Probate
Code if the other spouse had been adjudicated incompetent, but
the competent spouse had to post bond, have an appraisal of
the estate, and provide an inventory whether or not there
were surviving children. The wife could convey her separate
property under the provisions of article 4617 in (3) above.
(5) From 1957 to 1963 either spouse could convey community
homestead under the provisions of section 157 without posting
bond or having an appraisal. Either spouse could convey his
separate property homestead under the provisions of article
4617 which require a court order.
(6) Since 1963 either spouse can convey the community property
homestead under the provisions of section 157 in (5) above.
Either spouse can convey separate property homestead with-
out a court order under the provisions of article 4618.
However, as in the abandonment provisions, the courts have not in-
terpreted the provisions in a manner which a strict reading of the
statutory language would indicate, and considerable confusion has
resulted.
B. Judicial Interpretation
Prior to the existence of any statutory provisions, the right of a hus-
band to convey the homestead without joinder of an insane wife was
established by Shields v. Aultman, Miller & Co.' There, the hus-
band had sold the community homestead while his wife was in an
insane asylum. Her guardian brought suit to regain title to the prop-
erty from the owner. No adjudication of the wife's insanity had been
made and no necessity was shown to justify the husband's conveyance.
't20 Tex. Civ. App. 345, 50 S.W. 219 (1899) error ref.
1966]
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Concluding that "the law never requires impossibilities," the court
reasoned that if the husband could not sell without her joinder he
could not sell at all, since she was unable to join while insane. 5
The Shields case clearly demonstrates the continuing philosophy of
the Texas courts in this area, i.e., to protect the property rights of the
sane spouse and his vendee. However, the insane spouse should have
his homestead protected from an unwanted sale while he is unable
to protect it himself. The rights of the insane spouse and his need for
protection are problems which the Texas courts have rarely recog-
nized and never attempted to solve either before or after the statutory
provisions relating to insanity were provided.
When the Spouse Has Been Adjudicated Insane After the 1893
amendment to the community administration provisions the El Paso
Court of Civil Appeals dealt with a situation similar to Shields but
reached a contrary result." The court held that since the husband had
not qualified as community administrator, and since there were surviv-
ing children, his deed executed without his wife's joinder was void even
though she had been adjudicated insane. The court explained the ap-
parent contradiction in the two opinions by pointing out that the
deed in Shields was executed before there was a statutory provision
allowing a conveyance by the spouse of an insane, while the deed in
question had been executed after these provisions were added, but
without compliance with their procedures. According to the court's
reasoning, the community administration procedures provided the ex-
clusive means for the spouse of an insane to convey valid title to the
community homestead. Therefore, the husband's failure to follow
these procedures rendered his deed void."'
Four years later the Texas Supreme Court reversed this decision. "
Although it recognized that a statutory provision had been enacted
to enable the husband to acquire control over the community prop-
erty upon the wife's insanity, the court held that this was not the
exclusive procedure. Rather it found that the statutory provisions were
only an addition to the husband's previously existing right to sell the
community property, without court approval, to pay the community
debts when the wife is dead or insane. The decision should have had
no value as a precedent for deciding a homestead case, however, since
the supreme court specifically found that the locus in quo was not
44Id. at 221.
4Shields v. Aultman, Miller & Co., 20 Tex. Civ. App. 345, 50 S.W. 219 (1899) error
ref.
4Gibson v. Pierce, 146 S.W. 983 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) error granted rev.
7 Ibid.
"'Pierce v. Gibson, 108 Tex. 62, 184 S.W. 502 (1916).
[Vol. 20:794
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homestead property at the time of the conveyance." Furthermore, if
the statutory provision was merely an addition to the existing power
of the husband to dispose of the property to pay debts, the decision
should have had even less application to a homestead case since home-
stead is specifically exempt from liability for community debts."
In the same year the Fort Worth Court of Civil Appeals stated that
a husband whose wife had been adjudicated insane could give good
title to the homestead owned as his separate property.5 Once again,
the authority of the decision is undermined by the court's holding,
apparently as an afterthought, that the property in question was not
homestead."
In 1916 the same appellate court held 3 that a husband whose wife
had been adjudicated insane had no right to sell the community
homestead without joinder. The two former cases were distinguished
on the basis that in both decisions the property was found to be non-
homestead. To the extent that former cases held that insanity alone
would authorize the husband to convey the homestead, they were con-
sidered unsound on the basis that such a conveyance would violate
the constitution.' The court reasoned that because the homestead is
not liable for debts, its sale can never be "necessary in a legal sense.""'
It was concluded that even if the purchase money had been used to
pay an existing debt of the community this would not make the con-
veyance valid.
In 1921 the Commission of Appeals held that the wife had no
power to convey community property upon her husband's insanity
when there were surviving children unless she complied with the
requirements of the community administrative statutes. Thus, the
Commission confirmed the decision that compliance with the com-
munity administration statutes was the only way the sane spouse
41 ibid.
50TEX. CONST. art. 16, 5 50 (1876).
"Gilley v. Troop, 146 S.W. 954 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) error ref.
"2Ibid.
'3 Priddy v. Tabor, 189 S.W. 111 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) error dism. by agreement.
4 The court based its opinion on Heidenheimer v. Thomas, 63 Tex. 287 (1885). In
Heidenheimer, a husband and wife had executed a deed to the homestead property and the
wife later tried to rescind the sale on the basis of the husband's insanity at the time of the
conveyance. The buyer defended on the basis that the wife alone could make a valid con-
veyance if her husband was insane. In holding the deed void the court said, "We are of the
opinion, however, that no such power rests in the wife of an insane person at least in refer-
ence to community property or separate property of the husband. The law provides for the
appointment of guardians of the estates of persons of unsound mind and renders unnecessary
the exercise of any such power by the wife." Id. at 291.
"Priddy v. Tabor, 189 S.W. 111 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) error dism. by agreement.
"Howell v. Fidelity Lumber Co., 228 S.W. 181, 183 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921).
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could obtain control, management, and disposition of the community
property.
This was seemingly the state of the law until 1926 when the Texas
Supreme Court decided Green v. Windham." The husband sought to
cancel a deed transferring community property homestead which he
had executed after qualifying as community administrator after his
wife had been adjudicated insane. The court held that because the hus-
band had complied with the statutory requirements, he possessed power
to make a valid conveyance. The court indicated that the commun-
ity administration statutes prescribed a "particular" method for the
alienation of community property, including the homestead, by either
husband or wife when the other spouse has become insaneY Although
such language would seem to indicate that the procedure under article
3663 was the "particular"( i.e., exclusive) method for making such
a conveyance, the court added the following reasoning:
But [neither] the Constitution nor the statutes contemplated an im-
possibility; neither was it in contemplation that under impossible con-
ditions the homestead, once acquired, should remain so forever or indefi-
nitely regardless of the desires or welfare of the parties .... It was not
the consent of the one wholly incompetent and wholly unable to give
consent that was in the contemplation of the makers of the Constitution
and the statutes in prescribing the conditions under which or the meth-
ods by which a homestead may be alienated."
Moreover, the court specifically approved decisions"0 where the convey-
ance of the homestead without qualifications under article 3663 was
held valid, stating that "the principles of law were the same."'" This
latter language seems to indicate that the community administration
provisions are not the exclusive means of validly conveying the home-
stead without joinder of an insane spouse." The court made no change
in its position from 1926 until 1955. After 1955 the provisions of
section 157 settled the problem when one spouse had been adjudicated
insane.
Cases With No Adjudication of Insanity The question of the valid-
ity of a conveyance in the absence of an adjudication of insanity was
I I15 Tex. 162, 278 S.W. 1101 (1926).
ISld. at 1102.
"Ibid.
00 The court specifically approved Shields v. Aultman, Miller & Co., 20 Tex. Civ. App.
345, 50 S.W. 219 (1899) error ref., and Gilley v. Troop, 146 S.W. 954 (Tex. Civ. App.
1912) error ref., and disapproved the decision in Priddy v. Tabor, 189 S.W. 111 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1916) error dism. by agreement.
61115 Tex. 162, 278 S.W. 1101, 1102 (1926).
" The court further indicated in dicta that the existence or nonexistence of community
debts was not important to the validity of such conveyance.
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raised in Donaldson v. Meyer"' where a couple sued to cancel a joint
conveyance of community property homestead on the ground that
the husband was insane at the time the deed was executed. The de-
fendant claimed that even if the husband was insane, the deed was
valid since the wife had signed it and under the provisions of the
community administration statutes the wife had the power to dispose
of the community property upon the husband's insanity. The Texas
Commission of Appeals, however, held the deed invalid and ruled that
article 3662 was inapplicable because it covered only the situation
where the nonjoining spouse (in this case the husband) had been
adjudicated insane."4 The reasoning of the decision provides protection
for both the insane spouse and, indirectly, the buyer. If adjudication of
insanity and qualification as a community administrator are required,
there can be no question about the validity of deeds executed by one
spouse since he or she must receive prior court approval.
Donaldson, however, did not settle the question. Reynolds Mort-
gage Co. v. Gambill,"' a Commission case later adopted by the Supreme
Court, held that neither adjudication of insanity nor qualification as
community administrator was necessary before the husband had power
to convey good title to the community homestead without joinder of
the wife. In Reynolds the husband and wife had sold the homestead
to their son, and by mesne conveyances the note for the purchase price
had come into the hands of the mortgage company. The son defaulted
on his note and the husband and wife brought suit to void their orig-
inal deed, claiming the incapacity of both. The Commission found the
wife insane but the husband sane at the time of the conveyance and
held the deed valid. It cited as authority Green v. Windham (which
involved a wife who had been adjudicated insane and a husband who
conveyed after qualifying as community administrator); Gilley v.
Troop (which involved non-homestead property); and Shields v.
Aultman, Miller & Co. (which involved a conveyance made prior to
the laws dealing with community administration upon insanity)."
This decision, indicating that it makes no difference whether the
husband qualifies as community administrator, is difficult to under-
stand in the face of community administration statutes requiring
63 261 S.W. 369 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924).
"Id. at 371. The court specifically found that of the $5,000 paid for the land, $2,800
had been used by the husband and wife for necessaries and that $200 was still on hand and
ordered this money to be paid back to the defendant. Ibid.
"S115 Tex. 273, 280 S.W. 531 (1926).
"Id. at 532. In discussing these three earlier cases they expressly adopt the insanity of
the spouse rather than the fact that the locus in quo had been abandoned as homestead as the




such qualification when there are surviving children. The opinion was
based on the dicta in Green v. Windham that the existence of debts
makes no difference in regard to the husband's power to convey the
homestead upon the wife's insanity."7 The reasoning in Reynolds ap-
parently was that since administration is only for the purpose of pay-
ing debts and the homestead forms no part of the estate for the pur-
pose of paying debts, administration is unnecessary when a conveyance
of the homestead is involved. "8
The holding seems to have occurred through the court's failure to
distinguish between the two distinct purposes of the statute (i.e., ad-
ministration upon intestacy and administration upon insanity)."6 The
provision for intestacy is obviously to enable the surviving spouse to
continue managing the community property and pay off any debts
before administration of the deceased spouse's estate is closed and the
heirs take the property free of debts. If there are no debts there is no
need for administration. But the provisions for administration upon
insanity cannnot operate in the same manner. Since the insane spouse
is not dead, the property does not pass to the heirs. Nor is there a ne-
cessity for settling the estate and hence immediately satisfying credi-
tors. The purpose of the statute, therefore, should not be for the pro-
tection of creditors, but for the protection of the insane spouse and
the convenience of the sane spouse. To say as the Commission did in
Reynolds that because there are no debts there need be no administra-
tion upon insanity is to say that because there are no creditors to pro-
tect, the insane spouse needs no protection. The result is that upon
insanity a person is deprived of a right to homestead protection pro-
vided by the Constitution.
To compound this error, the Commission in Reynolds then held
that an adjudication of insanity was unnecessary." It was first con-
cluded that adjudication was required only if the sane spouse wished
to qualify as community administrator. The court then reasoned: (1)
one was required to qualify only if there were debts; (2) the existence
of debts is irrelevant when the homestead is involved; therefore, (3)
in a conveyance of the homestead an adjudication of insanity is un-
67 115 Tex. 162, 278 S.W. 1101, 1102 (1926).
6s Reynolds Mortgage Co. v. Gambill, 115 Tex. 273, 280 S.W. 531 (1926).
' Much of the confusion involved in the community administration statutes no doubt
is directly attributable to the fact that the provisions for administration upon insanity were
merely added to an existing statute which dealt with administration upon intestacy. The
courts treated the provisions for insanity in exactly the same manner as they had been
treating the provisions for intestacy. In the new Probate Code, the provisions for intestacy
and insanity have been separated and S 157 deals exclusively with insanity. This may
remedy any future confusion between the two.
"8 Reynolds Mortgage Co. v. Gambill, 115 Tex. 273, 280 S.W. 531 (1926).
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necessary." The result of this dubious reasoning is the creation of an
extra-statutory power in the husband to convey the community prop-
erty homestead when the wife is insane, even though there has been
no adjudication of insanity."2 Apparently, no necessity for the con-
veyance need be shown. The husband or the purchaser becomes the
judge of the wife's sanity, and the judicial protection which the com-
munity administration statutes should provide for an insane spouse's
homestead rights is taken away.
The decision in Reynolds made it clear that the community admin-
istration statute is construed as being merely cumulative and that
compliance is not necessary in order to convey good title. However,
article 4617, providing a means for the wife to convey her separate
property upon the insanity of the husband, appeared to be exclusive.
The supreme court dispelled any such notions in Ross v. Tide Water
Oil Co.7 In Ross a husband and wife conveyed an oil and gas lease on
the wife's separate property, which was their homestead. Later, they
attempted to rescind on the ground that the husband was insane at
the time he joined in the deed. The wife had not applied for the court
order provided in article 4617 which would have allowed her to dis-
pose of her separate property homestead. Nevertheless, the court held
the deed valid, stating:
It has been the rule in this state beginning with Wright v. Hay's Ad-
ministrator that joinder by the husband is unnecessary in a conveyance
by the wife where the husband has permanently abandoned the wife
or where the husband is insane. The rule is the same with reference to
homestead which is the separate property of the wife. 4
The court considered the provisions of article 4617 to be merely an
additional method by which the wife could convey her separate prop-
erty, and that compliance with that section and receipt of the court
order provided therein were not requisite for a valid conveyance. 
s
71 Ibid.
7" Magnolia Petroleum v. Still was closely followed in Higginbotham v. Fort Worth Nat'l
Bank, 172 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Civ. App. 143) error ref. Here the husband and wife created
a mechanic's lien against the homestead for repairs, and, upon foreclosure, they claimed the
incapacity of the wife to assent to the lien as required by the Texas Constitution. The creditor
conceded the wife's insanity. The court held that the lien was valid even if the wife was
insane because the reasons which allowed a husband to convey the homestead without her
joinder would also allow him to execute a valid lien without her joinder and that it made
no difference that the wife had not been adjudicated. Id. at 404.
'aRoss v. Tide Water Oil Co., 145 S.W.2d 1089 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
74 1d. at 1090.
15 Id. at 1092. In an earlier case dealing with the wife's power to convey her separate
property homestead under such circumstances the court of civil appeals came to the con-
clusion that the wife's power to convey without her husband's joinder was restricted to cases
of necessity. Lawson v. Armstrong, 227 S.W. 687 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) error dism. The
conveyance occurred in 1911; therefore, the provisions of articles 4617 and 4618 allowing
the wife to convey her separate property homestead were not available.
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One year later a court of civil appeals completely razed the citadel
of homestead protection in Magnolia Petroleum v. Still."6 The husband
and wife had executed a deed conveying mineral interests in com-
munity property homestead. The proceeds from the sale had been
used to pay off a vendor's lien on the land, a grocery bill and medical
expenses. The husband had not been adjudicated insane, the wife had
not qualified as community administrator, and there were surviving
children. Nevertheless, the court decided that the deed was good even
though the husband was insane at the time it was executed. The court
reasoned that since the husband was insane, the wife had power to
convey the community homestead without his joinder; therefore, her
joinder to his deed constituted a valid conveyance. The court declared
that the right to convey is a right concurrent with ownership and
that it is only by statute that the wife is deprived of this power dur-
ing marriage. Since the law does not require the impossible, if the
husband becomes insane the wife regains her power to convey. The
community administration laws were considered to be cumulative of
the existing right to convey the community property for the purpose
of discharging a lien thereon or paying for necessaries." The court
distinguished the holding in Donaldson v. Meyer on the grounds that
there it was not shown that the sale was made to pay for neces-
saries." This is obviously a fallacious distinction since in Donaldson,
the court specifically found that $2,800 of the $5,000 purchase price
had been used for necessaries."
The court in Magnolia did admit that in order to get unqualified
power to convey without a showing of necessity the wife would have
to qualify under the community administration statutes."s This is
inconsistent with Reynolds which specifically held that the existence
of debts was immaterial to the husband's power to convey the home-
stead when he had not qualified under the community administration
statutes." This inconsistency caused a further conflict with article
3678 which gave the wife the same powers of control, management,
and disposition of the community property upon insanity of the hus-
band as he would have upon her insanity."2
76 163 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error ref.
'7 Ibid.781 Id. at 271.
7 See note 64 supra.
so 163 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error ref.
81 See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
8 2 Tex. Acts., 1893, ch. 68, § 1, 10 GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 88 (1898). Former art.
3678, Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. (1925).
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The court has made no change in its position since the decision in
Magnolia." Therefore, upon the insanity of one spouse, the other may
convey the homestead without joinder of the insane in the following
ways: (1) If the homestead is the separate property of the sane
spouse, that spouse may convey it without a court order or an adjudi-
cation of insanity under the provisions of article 4618. (2) If the
property is the community homestead, the sane spouse may convey it
after the other has been adjudicated insane under the provisions of
section 157. (3) If the homestead is the community property and the
other spouse is insane but has not been so adjudicated, the sane spouse
may convey it with no judicial determination of power to convey or
adjudication of insanity of the nonjoining spouse.
IV. CONCLUSION
The rules surrounding homestead protection under abnormal cir-
cumstances provide a study in confusion. The basic problem stems
from the failure of the courts to hold that the statutory provisions are
exclusive and mandatory. This situation can be attributed to the ab-
sence for a number of years of any statutory procedures allowing a
spouse to convey the homestead in circumstances of abandonment or
insanity. To fill this hiatus in the statutory law a considerable body of
case law developed which at the time was necessary to fill the void.
However, because the courts did not choose to regard the applicable
statutes as exclusive when they finally were provided, these statutes
have failed to improve the situation appreciably.
A partial solution to the problem would be to make such statutes as
section 157 of the Probate Code mandatory. This would certainly pre-
clude the kind of conveyance approved in Reynolds Mortgage and
Magnolia Petroleum when injustice obviously could, and perhaps did,
occur by depriving an insane spouse of homestead rights. But this
would not solve the problem completely since some contingencies in-
dicated by the case law are not covered by the statutes. Therefore, if
the statutory provisions are to become mandatory, they must also be
made comprehensive so that no need to resort to extra-statutory pow-
ers can exist.
The abandonment statutes provide only for the situation when
the homestead is the separate property of the abandoned spouse. In
most cases, however, the homestead is community property. The ab-
sence of any provision for a prior adjudication of an abandoned
"'Schmidt v. Schmidt, 403 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); Reed v. Beheler, 198
S.W.2d 625 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
1966]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
spouse's power to convey the community homestead invites continua-
tion of the judicial interpretation now established that such a convey-
ance is valid. Moreover, if a judicial determination of abandonment
is not deemed necessary for transferring the community property
homestead, it seems to follow that there is little reason to require a pre-
requisite finding for the conveyance of the abandoned spouse's separate
property homestead since the abandoning spouse's interest in it is pre-
sumably less worthy of protection. Therefore, these statutes should be
made comprehensive by enabling an abandoned spouse to receive an
adjudication of his power to deal with the community property home-
stead. In addition, the 1963 amendment to article 4618 which allows
one spouse to convey the separate property homestead upon abandon-
ment or insanity of the other without a court order was not accom-
panied by a similar amendment to article 4617 which still requires a
court order under the same circumstances. The resulting confusion
should be corrected, preferably by combining the provisions of the
two statutes and requiring a court order.
The statutory provisions regarding insanity present different prob-
lems. Since 1957 these provisions have been complete insofar as either
spouse, upon the other's insanity, can be empowered by judicial action
to sell the homestead whether it is separate or community property.
There is, therefore, no circumstance left unmentioned which would
create a necessity for extra-statutory conveyances. However, the
propriety of requiring compliance with section 157 and forcing an
adjudication of insanity is questionable. In the case when one spouse
wishes to convey without joinder because he or she knows the other
is insane, the statute is probably too rigorous because it requires an
adjudication of insanity. Though modern medical thought indicates
that insanity is merely an illness, there remains a certain social stigma
which some people attach to having a member of one's family declared
incompetent or insane. In addition, if the spouse is only incapacitated
but not insane, the ordeal of adjudication would be no help to an al-
ready disturbed mind. It might be advisable, therefore, to create a pro-
cedure similar to that provided in article 4617, whereby the judge
might hear the facts in a relatively informal procedure, and issue an
order empowering the sane spouse to convey the homestead, if he is
satisfied that the other spouse is incapacitated.
In the situation when both spouses sign the deed and later try to
avoid it because of the incompetence of one, the equities on both sides
are compelling and competing. On one hand, the buyer generally has
no warning that anything is wrong with the deed. On the other hand,
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an insane spouse is entitled to the same protection afforded any other
insane person. At present when a married person is involved, the
problem is that the same fact of insanity which causes the deed of an
insane to be voidable also empowers his spouse to convey without
joinder. Thus, when the spouses contest a conveyance by proving the
insanity of one, they also prove the capacity of the other to convey
alone. There is presently no way a deed to the homestead joined in by
both husband and wife can be declared invalid because of insanity
unless both the husband and the wife are found to be insane at the
time of conveyance.
One reason for this curious result is that no distinction is made be-
tween the situation in which one spouse knows the other is insane and
intends to convey the property without joinder and the situation in
which both sign and one spouse is later found to have been insane.
Because the sane spouse did not intend to exercise the special powers
resulting from insanity of the other spouse, this "after the fact" dis-
covery of the insanity should not be construed as making the con-
veyance valid. Prevention of such inadvertent use of the conveying
power could be achieved by a rule that no such power exists unless
the other spouse has been adjudicated insane. On the other hand, any
spouse wishing to take advantage of this rule and to avoid a deed
signed by both on the ground that the other was insane but not so
adjudicated should have the burden of proving the other spouse's
insanity at the time of the conveyance and that the sane spouse was
unaware of that condition. In addition, since a deed of an insane per-
son is only voidable, to rescind the conveyance the sane spouse should
be required to do equity by returning the full purchase price to the
buyer. In the case when one spouse knows that the other is insane but
does not have the other spouse so adjudicated and allows the insane to
join in a deed, the sane spouse should be estopped from claiming any
benefit from the other's insane condition. However, in order to protect
the insane spouse in such a situation, the sane spouse's deed should not
be held to convey homestead rights of the insane in the property.
This is the present interpretation of the effect of a deed signed by one
spouse without the joinder of the other." Since the joinder of an in-
sane is for all practical purposes the same as no joinder, it seems en-
tirely equitable to make the effect of a deed signed by an insane spouse,
when the other spouse knows of the insane condition, the same as
when one spouse conveys without the joinder of a sane spouse.
"' Grissom v. Anderson, 125 Tex. 26, 79 S.W.2d 619 (1935); Marino v. Lombardo, 277
S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e.; Wooten v. Pennock, 52 Tex. Civ. App.
430, 114 S.W. 465 (1909).
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The conclusion is inescapable that strict compliance with the con-
stitutional provision requiring joinder of both spouses is unrealistic
when these abnormal circumstances of abandonment, imprisonment
or insanity are present. But it is equally inescapable that the present
methods for avoiding joinder under these circumstances are indefen-
sible. The statutes are inadequate for both abandonment and insanity
and the judicially established remedies leave the non-conveying spouse
virtually unprotected.
The legislative attempts to remedy this situation seem to be moving
in the direction of less formal requirements for one spouse to convey
valid title to the homestead, (e.g., the 1963 amendment to article
4618). The cases, however, indicate that to give adequate protection
to the rights of the conveying spouse, the non-conveying spouse, and
the buyer, it is necessary to require the conveying spouse to obtain a
judicial determination of his power to convey prior to the transfer.
This can be accomplished only by legislation affording a procedure
for such judicial determination under each abnormal circumstance and
making compliance with the procedures mandatory in order to con-
vey valid title to the homestead.
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